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Abstract:
Over five decades a new decentralized model for the European capital city has
emerged through the distribution of European Union (EU) institutions and agencies, but as
the result of national compromise and competition rather than the implementation of a vision
of Europe. More than a purely administrative issue, the location of EU headquarters opens
questions on the nature of European spatiality, the relation between politics and space and the
role of headquarters cities in that space. To date, the decentralized unplanned structure has
brought economic and symbolic benefits to the host cities and nations, but has also
caused—notably in Brussels—the destruction of neighbourhoods and increased
socio-economic disparities. This article argues that, given the particular history and structure
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of the EU and the Eastern enlargement of 2004, a deliberate polycentric headquarters policy
is necessary: to balance competition and collaboration among host cities, to tie the political
EU capitals into larger economic network of cities, and to align it with polycentricity
stipulated by the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). Such a policy would
contribute to the emergence of a postnational European space, promote European identity
and synergy, and facilitate the integration of cities and citizens in Eastern Europe into the
EU.

The coming together of Europe in the post-World War II period has led to increased
collaboration on political, economic, social, and cultural levels and to the emergence of new
postnational, cross-border European spatialities that need to be identified and analyzed. A
distinctly European spatial issue, and one that provides insight into the struggles between
European authorities and between competing national and local interests, is the location of
headquarters for EU-policy and decision-making institutions—(notably the main
Community institutions, the Commission, Council, and Parliament)—and for European
agencies, (bodies governed by European public law, created to accomplish specific technical,
scientific or managerial tasks defined in Community acts).
Since the Second World War, politicians and observers alike have dreamt of a future
single and monumental European capital city. But wrangling among member states about the
physical location of these institutions and agencies, because of their economic, political, and
symbolic importance, has led to the existence of multiple headquarters, with three locations
for the main EU institutions--Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg--and about twenty other
cities hosting agencies (Hein, 2004). Thus far the “design” of the EU headquarters is the
result of national compromises and local economic initiatives rather than European visions.
This article argues that the location of EU headquarters is not just an administrative issue,
similar to that of the selection of a major company seat, but a topic intimately related to
European symbolism and identity building. As a direct application of EU policies and
principles on the ground, involving the interaction among EU institutions, national
governments, local authorities and citizens, the locations and forms of the EU capital reflect
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the ongoing redefinition of the EU’s political, economic, social and physical space beyond
national borders. Moreover, decisions about the capital test the EU’s cohesion policy and its
ability and willingness to mitigate economic forces that aim at socio-economic segregation.
And decisions about the capital mark the EU’s capacity to positively interact with European
citizens, in the headquarters cities and beyond.
Through the selection of multiple headquarters, this article argues, the EU has
developed a new polycentric capital form, raising a broader array of questions: What is the
meaning of polycentricity in the EU and who promotes it? What is a polycentric capital and
what are the relations between the various cities hosting EU institutions and agencies? Does
the polycentric capital transcend national powers or does it reinforce them? Is the current
polycentricity just a temporary status or is it the way towards a definitive solution? Does the
polycentric capital concept help or complicate Eastern enlargement? Will it increase
competitiveness or can it actually promote the cohesion strategy, balance socio-economic
development, and increase the involvement of citizens?
In order to respond to these questions, this article first investigates the concept of
polycentricity as it has developed in the EU and as the European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP) propagates it. Following a brief history of the polycentric EU capital, it
then analyses the applicability of this term to the capitals of the EU, defining and analyzing
the relationships among them. Finally, the essay examines how the polycentric structure
allows for the integration into the EU of cities in new member states. The essay argues in
conclusion that a deliberate polycentric policy may balance competition among the EU
capitals and with all other European cities, mitigate economic forces, and help establish a
postnational European space, providing a solution to promote European identity and synergy
and facilitate enlargement.

The emergence of polycentricity and the European Spatial Development Perspective

The Single European Act of 1986, which prepared for the advent of the European
Union (EU) in 1992, laid the basis for the so-called cohesion policy aimed at a balanced and
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sustainable development in all parts of the EU to be achieved through policy means, as well
as improved life quality for all citizens (Rumford, 2000). These positive aspects of the
cohesion policy would offset the burden that its single market would create for less favoured
regions (Forget, 1979, Romus, 1990, Faludi, 2002, Martin and Robert, 2002, Jensen and
Richardson, 2004). Based on this concept, the recent European Spatial Development
Perspective (ESDP), approved by the ministers of the members of the European Union in
1999, promotes interconnected transportation and communications infrastructure,
transnational collaboration, and the development of cultural and natural heritage as part of a
balanced, polycentric system of towns and cities. The goal was to encourage each locality in
the pursuit of its specific objectives and to create specialized centres across the EU
(Kunzmann and Wegener, 1991, Faludi, 2000, Faludi, 2002, Waterhout, 2002, Faludi, 2004,
Jensen and Richardson, 2004).
The ESDP is one example of the EU concretely addressing issues of spatial
development, and of the territorialization of the EU’s rather abstract functions. Although the
programs established by the EU offer general guidelines for a balanced and environmentally
aware approach to spatial planning, they include no active planning policy. At present, any
intervention by the EU is limited to stimulating local projects. It is left to cities and
(particularly in the case of capital cities) their respective national governments to initiate
projects, to use their geographical and infrastructural positions to develop their economies,
and to promote themselves by attaching Europe to their names. Hosting EU agencies or
activities is so far largely a means of increasing the economic potential of a city.
The rapidly growing literature on polycentricity in the EU has tackled a variety of
issues surrounding the ESDP: the development of super-regions (Nadin, 2002, Zonneveld,
2005), the various EU-sponsored so-called INTERREG programs aimed at promoting
transnational cooperation (Faludi, 2000, Pedrazzini, 2005), issues of city networking
(Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network), and the place of European cities
in the global economy.
The question of how locations for EU headquarters are selected and how these
institutions are integrated into specific cities has not been discussed in the context of the
polycentricity debate. Yet the location and design of a capital offers an excellent example of
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an emerging new EU spatiality and of the interaction among multiple layers of European
policy making—European, national, regional and local authorities—as well as private
stakeholders and citizens on spatial issues. — These decisions are thus a concrete part of the
creation of a postnational Europe.

Creation of a postnational European space and its capital

From 1952, with the establishment of the first European community, the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), until 1992, the EU opted for three temporary
headquarters for its main institutions while postponing a definitive solution to the location
question. Faced with the impossibility of obtaining a unanimous agreement on the site of a
capital city, the EU made the three temporary headquarters permanent with the Edinburgh
decision of 1992. Indeed, since the 1990s the EU has broadened the number of host cities to
more than twenty by establishing new decentralized agencies on the periphery of its territory.
Figure 1 shows that EU headquarters functions are spread out over Europe, with the
central location of the three main headquarters offset by the decentralization of many smaller
agencies. As a result, a European space beyond national borders is emerging. The EU
presence is strongest in Brussels, which in 2005 hosted about 27,000 of the more than 34,000
permanent employees and 2,092 temporary workers.i. While most agencies have only a few
hundred employees, some host up to 2500 workers; the European Central Bank (ECB) in
Frankfurt, alone employs almost half as many people as the EU does in all of Luxembourg,
for example. The desire to disperse these agencies throughout the member states and away
from the EU core area, although never expressed as policy or embodied in site selection
procedures, is clearly visible on the ground. They are spread unevenly across countries:
Spain, for example, hosts three agencies, whereas Sweden and Finland host none. This
discrepancy may be related to the size of the population in each country
So far, national expectations have strongly influenced the location of agencies a
straightforward and open policy on the distribution of headquarters or on competitions for
their location does not exist. The continuously strong national interests in the making of a
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European space are also evidenced in the selection of cities for the Capitals of Culture
program through which, since its inception in 1985, one or more European cities have been
selected as „cultural capitals” to offer activities celebrating a multifaceted European identity.
The Capital of Culture function rotates among member states. Following changes in 1999
(Decision 1419/1999/EC), the Council of the EU now makes the decision, taking into
account the views of an independent jury of experts in the culture sector. The dominance of
national interests in the selection of European headquarters continues, as evidenced in the
location in national capitals of the so-called Houses of Europe, representations of the
Commission, and the Parliament.
Despite the continuously strong presence of national interest in the making of a
European space, this article argues that the EU is effectively building a capital spread out
over multiple locations, what I call a polycentric capital. The selection of EU headquarters is
much more than a bureaucratic, national decision and the term ‘seat’ used by EU institutions
for their headquarters does not appropriately reflect their function. The term and concept of a
‘seat’ does not take into account the political and cultural dimensions of the emerging
European Union. It limits the space of representation to primarily private and architectural
elements that can be easily displaced or split between various locations and is typical for the
physical representation of major companies and international institutions. The concept of the
‘capital’ on the contrary relates to multiple elements within and beyond the government
zone. Not only political and administrative buildings—the headquarters—but also cultural
and leisure functions and urban and built forms beyond the government zone throughout the
host area contribute to the creation of a capital. Even though spatial policy is still largely in
the hands of national governments, the EU—both as a major policy-making institution, and
through its concrete presence in host cities—sets examples for buildings and urban
interventions as well as for citizen interaction.
For this article, all EU institutions and agencies as well as highly symbolic
events—including itinerant ones such as the Capital of Culture programme—are thus
perceived as being part of the capital. The term capital city is, however, handicapped by the
dominant imagery of a capital city as built and conceived in the nineteenth century for strong
nation states. Paris, with its national museums, theatres, operas, public spaces, and

6

monuments, is the most eloquent example of such a national capital, but its close association
with national interests makes it least appropriate in the context of an emerging EU. Because
the EU is based on nation-states, and because numerous European cities are willing to host
the EU are too small to house the entire institution without risking their identities, the
emergence of multiple headquarters without common forms makes sense.
The current location of EU organs is primarily the result of national lobbying and
local considerations, which treat the European presence as an opportunity for urban
economic development and city marketing. A different facet of Europe is being built in each
of the European headquarters, depending on local, regional, and national land use and
planning policies. Economic interests and public-private collaboration with minimal citizen
participation have characterized the construction of some headquarters buildings, most
notably in Brussels. In contrast, Luxembourg and Strasbourg have made attempts at
improving the quality of the built and urban environment and the life of citizens in the last
fifteen years, and Frankfurt is using the construction of the European Central Bank (ECB) to
revitalize the former wholesale market site (Hein 2004).
The current dispersed, opportunistic European capital clearly differs from the
national capitals of the EU in its regional integration and urban governance, but it may be an
appropriate form for the new political structure of the EU (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).
Assuming that the EU will eventually have a capital and not a seat, that the current host cities
and nations will not permit resident institutions to leave, and that multiple locations will be
acknowledged as helping to promote the emergence of European synergy and identity, the
EU may develop the current decentralized form into a deliberate polycentric capital policy,
aimed at balancing competition and collaboration—both among the host cities as well as
between them and other European cities. On a par with the innovative character of the
European Union itself, the polycentric EU capital would highlight the multilayered structure
of European governance, the interaction of Europeanization and globalization with national
and local structures, and allow for the involvement of citizens in the construction of
European symbolism and place identity through its capitals (Hague and Jenkins, 2005).
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Polycentricity on the European scale

The decentralization of EU headquarters occurs at the same time as a growing
political, bureaucratic, and academic awareness and interest in spatial European networks.
Although the term polycentricity has as yet no agreed–upon definition, it is widely used in
policy papers, notably in the context of the European Spatial Development Perspective
(ESDP). Generally, polycentricity can be defined as a settlement pattern with multiple
centres or nodes rather than a single, dominant metropolis. This vague definition invites
further investigation of its territorial scale, and the form and quality of interaction among its
nodes.
Whether it is called this or not, polycentricity has a long history in Europe, and
connectivity between cities in Europe continues to be higher than in the U.S. (Taylor, 2003).
Definitions and perceptions of polycentricity have changed over time, but historic networks
continue to influence current structures. Historic cross-border collaborations in Europe,
developed between trading cities such as the Hanseatic cities (Bourdeau-Lepage and Huriot,
accessed 2005/4/28), continue to be cultural, technological, social, political, and economic
exchanges, including such concrete manifestations as interconnected transport and
communication infrastructures. a. Today, some European states, notably Germany, have a
well-established network of cities, each with its own specialization. For the purpose of this
analysis, then, it is essential to define the term precisely.
The planner Simin Davoudi points out that practioners and scholars apply the term
polycentricity to very different scales: (a) within individual cities, to designate multiple
subcentres, in contrast to monocentric development; (b) multiple centres within one region
(Polycentric Urban Regions); and (c) on the European level, as a less hierarchical alternative
to the concept of core and periphery (Davoudi, 2002). The first definition is often discussed
under the term decentralization. The second definition is currently getting more attention
(Bailey and Turok, 2001, Krätke, 2001, Parr, 2003, Turok and Bailey, 2004, Meijers, 2005,
Zonneveld, 2005) and some of the analytical tools developed in that context can be applied to
the third meaning that is at the heart of the current investigation.
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Defining the scale of a polycentric space does not fully capture the meaning of the
term; the relationship between the cities and regions involved also needs to be examined.
Evert Meijers (2005) from the Technische Universteit Delft, writing on Polycentric Urban
Regions (PURs), differentiates two types of networks: club types, where actors have a
common objective (for example, a tennis club) based on horizontal synergy; and web types,
where each actor pursues a different activity (for example, a chain of businesses) and their
interaction is based on vertical synergy (Meijers, 2005). As Meijers points out, on the
European scale we find horizontal networks among cities of similar type: for example, port
cities, industrial cities, and tourist centres pursue the same interests and profit from common
marketing. Formal structures exist for some of these horizontal networks (Meijers 2005,
769): EUROCITIES fosters networking among approximately one hundred European cities
both within and outside of the current EU and aims to draw EU attention to urban issues;
POLIS, with 65 cities and regions from 18 countries, seeks to solve urban transportation and
environmental problems through innovative technologies and policies; and
ENERGIE-CITÉS, which consists of more than one hundred European municipalities,
intermunicipal groups, and local agencies, develops local initiatives for energy management,
the use of renewable energy, and the reduction of atmospheric emissions (Perulli et al.,
2002). Vertical networks link cities hosting complementary facilities throughout Europe: for
example, Airbus construction at multiple sites, and collaboration among universities across
Europe. Citing Capineri and Kamann (Capineri and Kamann, 1998), Meijers suggests that
networks do not adhere to one form, but usually overlap (2005, 768).
Intercity relationships, whether horizontal or vertical, need to be examined more
widely, as the British geographer Peter Taylor indicates (Taylor, 2003). Recently the
Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC), which Taylor codirects,
has focused on interurban connectivity and networks based on economic competition on a
global scale, reflecting the work of the globalization and urban studies scholar Saskia Sassen
(Sassen, 2001, Taylor et al., 2002, Taylor, (accessed 2005/4/28)). Economic competition
among European cities is consonant with the EU’s desire to increase global competitiveness,
but to some extent it conflicts with the EU’s own cohesion policy. Many scholars are
sceptical of whether it is possible to promote competition and cohesion at the same time and
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view the polycentricity discourse as a means to extend competition-oriented policies that
promote territorial inequality and contradict cohesion. The German geographer Stefan
Krätke (2001), for example, asks how the ESDP will deal with losers as it promotes
competitiveness, as well as with the socio-spatial polarization to be expected in the winning
cities. He also highlights the need for widespread citizen participation to facilitate the
emergence of a European identity.
This analysis of polycentricity raises further questions when translated to the EU
level. The cities hosting EU functions are part of multiple European, national, and regional
networks, interacting with each other and with other European cities in the overlapping
realms of economics, politics, and culture. The presence of EU headquarters adds another
dimension to the multiple layers and networks in which these cities compete and collaborate.
Does the EU presence in cities other than the three headquarters and Frankfurt have more
than symbolic value? Is it used only to enhance an economic competition based on local and
national initiatives? Are EU political decision-making powers actually decentralized? How
can the links between the networks be characterized? Do these networks also include
citizens?
The polycentricity of EU headquarters cities is not based on a policy so far, and the
current decentralization is not always effective. Whereas independent institutions can and
perhaps should be decentralized, the splitting of a single institution, the European Parliament,
over three locations seems detrimental to its functioning and unnecessarily expensive. The
relationship between EU institutions that allow for decentralization needs to be considered in
the perspective of a polycentric capital and in regard to the quality of its horizontal or vertical
relationships. So far, most of the EU’s decision-making institutions are located in Brussels
and horizontal relationships are limited to interaction between Brussels, Luxembourg,
Strasbourg, and Frankfurt. Luxembourg hosts many organs that are complementary with
those in Brussels, such as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB). Strasbourg, the official headquarters of the European Parliament, is in a more
delicate horizontal position, as day-to-day functions of the institution occur in Brussels and
the EP secretariat is located in Luxembourg. The relationship between Brussels and the
European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt is also horizontal, in spite of the significant
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difference in scale; a fact that needs further investigation. The relationship between Brussels
and the headquarters cities of most decentralized agencies is vertical, although many of these
cities participate on an equal footing in groups such as EUROCITIES. Given the evolving
nature of the EU and the changing number of employees, these relationships are bound to
change over time.
The existing pattern of decentralization offers real potential for the creation of
horizontal synergies and a network of headquarters cities that can lobby for common interests
and develop complementary features. Meijers demonstrates that in the Randstad
agglomeration in the Netherlands—consisting of the four largest cities and their surrounding
areas--voluntary cooperation and informal collaboration have led to horizontal synergy.
Indeed, Randstad has now set up a common office in Brussels to lobby the EU (Meijers,
2005). Moreover, developed as policy, a polycentric network based on local authorities and
citizens could strengthen local voices in the face of EU integration led by supranational
political and economic stakeholders. Support from citizen groups from all over Europe might
thus be a way to balance the largely entrepreneurial approach that has characterized EU
integration in Brussels so far. Collaboration of EU headquarters on multiple levels could also
contribute to resolving issues of local governance and finance. In the case of the
Brussels-Capital Region, for example, the important financial benefits from the EU presence
need to be assessed carefully, as the Brussels-Capital Region’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) are rising together with the average living standards of citizens, while the revenues of
regional or subregional governments are declining and earlier resident populations are being
pushed out because of rising costs. The question of the EU capital and the theme of a citizen
based polycentricity beyond economic networks are interrelated and must be discussed
together in order to form a policy perspective that can strengthen European spatial networks

The polycentric, opportunistic European capital and cities in the new member states

Recent developments in the EU indicate that the time is ripe for a renewed debate on
the question of an EU capital. These developments include the Eastern enlargement of 2004

11

and the consequent attempts by Eastern European cities (and their national governments) to
position themselves in economic European networks as well as in competition for EU
headquarters functions. While French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution in
2005 may express citizens’ criticism of the EU, it might also reflect the need for common
symbols and centres. Key issues in such a debate would include such a capital’s efficiency
and financing, its spatial policies, design and symbolism, and its role in the fostering of
European identity and citizenship. In the context of this larger body of questions that need
debate, this essay investigates the implications of the presence of EU headquarters functions
in cities of new member states.
The cities that most aggressively market themselves to gain or regain a prominent place
among European cities are national capital cities that can profit from long-standing
infrastructure connections and national support. They aim to overcome their socialist
legacies and compete with other European cities for EU headquarters functions, EU
subsidies, and economic investment from Western Europe. These spatial development
efforts highlight the polycentricity of the EU capital. That so many Eastern European capital
cities are positioning themselves to compete for EU headquarters counters to some extent the
European concept of an emerging European space less subject to nationalist influences.
Meanwhile their aggressive desire for economic development may lead to urban destruction
to the detriment of citizens and increased socio-economic discrepancies. What, then, is the
relationship between eastern enlargement and the polycentric EU capital discussed here?
The enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe brings into the EU a large number of
cities and countries that already have historic ties to cities in Western Europe and that wish to
recuperate their former standing as leading European cities, economically, culturally and
politically. As they position themselves to play a part in the emerging polycentric EU city
network and escape national constraints, they challenge cities in Western Europe that are also
increasingly developing their distinctiveness in order to promote themselves in EU urban
hierarchies (Hooghe and Marks, 2001, Le Galès, 2003).
While Eastern European cities compete with the pre-2004 member states
economically, they simultaneously enter collaborative networks with them. Budapest,
Prague, and Tallinn, for example, participate in POLIS, and with Warsaw they belong to
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EUROCITIES. INTERREG programs also go beyond the boundaries of the EU and include
member countries of the Council of Europe. Together, these programs are speeding up the
integration of Eastern European cities into collaborative networks of municipal authorities.
Similarly, these three cities are attempting to position themselves in cultural and EU
networks. Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic, and Cracow, Poland, have participated
in the Capital of Culture program in 2000, when that program chose nine cities, including
several from Eastern Europe, to be culture capitals in an exceptional move to celebrate the
millennium. Starting in 2009 a city from a pre-2004 member state and one from a new entrant
will hold the title. Linz, Austria and Vilnius, Lithuania will be the first pair in 2009. Nnine
Hungarian cities, including Budapest, have already applied for the European Capital of
Culture function for 2010, illustrating these cities’ desire to secure recognition of their
historical and cultural European identity.
The Eastern European cities and their nations have not shared the first fifty years of
European unification and may not feel represented by Brussels, Strasbourg, and
Luxembourg. Multiple headquarters and participation in symbolic events, as well as
integration into collaborative city networks, seem the most appropriate strategies to facilitate
current and future integration of numerous East European cities with long histories into the
economic and political networks of European centres. The observation by Jean-François
Drevet, a former member of the Directorate General on Regions of the Commission, that the
EU needs to live with its flexible border to the East, continues to be valid (Drevet, 2002).
Indeed, while it seems unlikely that the current headquarters cities and their nations are going
to let major EU institutions relocate, there is likely to be movement towards permanently
locating future decentralized agencies in cities of the new member states and holding
symbolic EU events in cities of the former Eastern bloc. The EU Council clearly indicated
this desire when it suggested that the newly created European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU
(FRONTEX) should be located in the new member states because these countries have the
longest land border. Six cities in Central and Eastern European countries —among them
Tallinn, Warsaw, and Budapest, selected as case studies here—heeded the call and applied to
host the new institution.
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Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, a city of 400,000 inhabitants, is a strong contender for
Baltic harbour functions, challenging Helsinki, the Finnish capital, for its role as the gateway
to Eastern Europe. Warsaw, with 1.7 million official inhabitants (but, if residents registered
elsewhere are included, probably over 2 million) the capital of Poland, the largest new
member state, emerges as a challenge to the German city network—particularly the desire of
Berlin to become a jumping-off board to the East—and an attractive site for EU functions
and new investment. Its location at the centre of the new member states makes it a
particularly convincing candidate for FRONTEX. Budapest, the capital of Hungary, with 1.9
million inhabitants, is the largest of these three cities, one of the southernmost cities in the
new member states, and the most important link to the three applicant countries of Romania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey. It also has deep historic ties to Vienna, a major growth poles in
south-eastern Europe.
The choice of an EU headquarters is a very competitive affair. There are, however, no
guidelines for selection that wins an agency. Instead, the application for gaining an EU
headquarters is largely a marketing attempt, as the applications submitted by the three cities
for housing FRONTEX show. The brochure prepared by the Ministry of the Interior of the
Republic of Estonia, for example, boasts about the city’s favourable geography and history,
its location at the centre of international communication axes, and its rapid development of
IT solutions. This marketing document echoes the hype of economic promotion. There is no
attempt to present these candidatures as part of creating European identity or symbolism, to
promote Europeanization among local citizens, or to build a European spatial network.
Indeed, spatial development in Europe has been and continues to be the outcome of
multilayered policy making in which the EU or visions of Europe play at most a minor role.
In the ESDP, the location of headquarters is not an issue, and it rarely addresses symbolic
questions (Jensen and Richardson 2004). As long as headquarters decisions are primarily the
result of national marketing efforts, they will not inspire European symbolism. In this case,
as in the selection of cities to host EU headquarters in the 1950s (Hein 2004), the final
selection of Warsaw was primarily the result of national distributive politics and political
wrestling; official visits by Polish leaders to counterparts in other countries seem to have
swayed opinion (interview with Janusz Gaciarz and Eliza Konczyk by Carola Hein, 30 June
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2005). The applications of the three cities to host EU functions do express their determination
to play major roles in the European urban network and evince the marketing strategies they
use to position themselves. They reflect urban managements based on economic principles
rather than citizens’ interests.
Websites for the three cities provide insight into their robust local and regional
economies. As centres of their respective nations, they are experiencing rapid growth.
Tallinn touts the transformation of its city centre; Warsaw identifies itself as an
up-and-coming place to do business; and Budapest promotes itself as a tourist destination and
gateway to the southeast (Municipality of Budapest, 2003). Major cities are no longer
confined to the “Blue Banana” region; instead, they are dispersed across the continent in a
“European Bunch of Grapes.” (Brunet, 1989) Several recent studies by private and public
institutions are mapping the potential of cities beyond the so-called “Pentagon,” the
economic core of Europe circumscribed by London, Paris, Milan, Munich, and Hamburg
(Kunzmann and Wegener, 1991, Kunzmann, 1997). As early as 1999, the “Roster of World
Cities” created by scholars from Loughborough University in England identified Budapest as
a world city and Warsaw as manifesting evidence of world city formation (Beaverstock et al.,
1999).
The emergence of cities outside of the traditional economic core suggests a
readjustment of nodal relationships, particularly among cities in the first 15 member states
that are geographically close to and have strong economic relationships with the new
member states and their capitals. It also indicates the need for a closer analysis of the ties
between cities, as economic competition and municipal collaboration often go hand in hand;
the diversity of these ties could be an inspiration for a polycentric capital. The case of Tallinn
and Helsinki illustrates this relationship of collaboration and competition. On the one hand,
Helsinki fears competition from Tallinn for harbour functions, as the Tallinn harbour is
larger and closer to Eastern Europe, which explains current proposals for the construction of
a new Helsinki harbour. On the other hand, these capitals need each other for the
development and promotion of the larger area. And as the Tallinn Investor’s Guide points
out, while the two cities are engaged in strong competition for residents, goods, and
international service functions, they cooperate to foster tourism and related services,
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international service functions, and investments (Figures 2a and b). For example, they are
collaborating in the crossborder politico-administrative structure EUREGIO
Helsinki-Tallinn and together pursue, Helsinki-Tallinn Science Twin-City Programme
sponsored by INTERREG IIIA.
The emergence of Eastern cities in European networks is an indication of their strong
and rapid raise also on an international scale. Claims by cities from new entrants’ states not
only for European but international status are supported by a study undertaken by Jones Lang
LaSalle that identifies so-called “rising stars,” cities that are expected to become world
players (Jones Lang LaSalle and LaSalle Investment Management, May 2003). Next to
unsurprising projections of economic leadership for several Chinese and Indian cities
including Shanghai, Guangzhou/Shenzen, Mumbai, and Delhi, there are several unexpected
suggestions. The study identifies Helsinki as a leading technology hub with recently
upgraded real estate stock. It cites Tallinn for its high level of technical education and a
favourable business environment; moreover, it notes that the city profits from its proximity to
Helsinki and Stockholm, even though its own real estate is limited. It lauds Budapest for its
attractive business environment, lively research and development activities, and expanding
real estate stock. The study reinforces Peter Taylor’s concept of a “porous Europe”, the idea
that European interurban relationships need to be analyzed in a global context (Taylor and
Derudder, 2004). Whether Warsaw and Budapest have dual relationships with other cities, as
Tallinn does, should be investigated; given their greater geographical distance from
neighbouring cities, these cities’ patterns of cooperation and competition may be more
complex. The inclusion of these and other peripheral cities in the class of world cities
underscores the increasing decentralization of the European urban network.
As the Eastern countries overcome their old economic system, the changes while
particular to post-socialist countries, have similarities to those in Brussels and other Western
cities during the 1950s and 1960s. The geographer Guy Baeten described the economic
growth coalitions Brussels formed, without respect to local interests and citizens’ needs, in
its bid to become the capital of Europe. (Baeten, 2001, Baeten, 2003) Similarly, marketing
efforts and entrepreneurial forces, are currently dominating the transformation of cities in the
new member states. Labour costs are still lower in Eastern Europe than in the first 15 EU
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countries, and citizen opposition has been almost nonexistent. Only very recently have
grassroots activities emerged in Warsaw. Overall, entrepreneurial forms of government
dominate in spite of the EU’s claims of cohesive development, socio-spatial redistribution,
and mitigated competition (Brenner, 2004).
Cities in Eastern and Central Europe are still struggling with the aftermath of the
Communist era. At the same time, these cities are positioning themselves on a European
scale, vying for investments and headquarters functions. All three cities have fairly
comprehensive planning concepts, but opportunistic local promotion occurs without being
framed by EU spatial planning.

Conclusion

New physical and social European spaces are emerging throughout Europe. A single
European capital might be more effective for the EU’s administrative purposes, but this is not
an option given the particularities of EU unification, the interests of nation states, and the
desire of some host cities to limit the number of EU employees in their walls. The
construction of a European identity through a polycentric and itinerant capital, with local
projects in multiple cities, is a more viable approach to the creation of European symbolism
Nonetheless, careful planning is necessary: to ensure that the decentralisation of specific
institutions and high-level events does not impede their effectiveness, to respond to the host
cities’ special needs due to its particular history, size, or political structure and, most
importantly, to provide citizens with ample opportunities to have their voices heard as easily
as those of organised lobbying groups. The EU can develop an appropriate aesthetic and
political architecture of its organs can only in response to local interests and preferences. The
intervention of citizens would give greater legitimacy to the EU, create a counterweight to
what is often perceived as a democratic deficit, and allow for construction of the European
capital bottom-up, as a local and citizen initiative, rather than top-down, based only on EU
decisions.
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Recent spatial planning initiatives such as the ESDP have attempted to mediate
entrepreneurial undertakings to transform the European space into a polycentric network, but
despite this initiative, spatial fragmentation continues. Similarly, the integration of cities
from the new member states into the polycentric EU capital network continues to be based on
national powers and economic promotion instead of European spatial plans or vision, and
citizen participation and the promotion of place identity as part of a European symbolism are
not prominent.
The emergence of a networked, polycentric capital and the integration of new
member countries require a comprehensive concept and an investigation into the meaning
and form of European civil society. To facilitate the integration of EU functions into cities of
the new member states, it is necessary for the EU to define clear policies on its headquarters,
as well as on land, as part of a European spatial planning approach. As Europe is coming
together in a step-by-step fashion without a long-term plan, it can use existing and emerging
patterns can with purpose. Civil servants could exchange places; common standards for the
organization of urban and architectural competitions for EU buildings could be adopted; EU
festivals occurring at the same time in multiple locations could be initiated; and collective
citizen initiatives facilitated. The creation of a common European identity from the bottom
up could be based on citizen participation in the polycentric headquarters and the
development of horizontal citizen networks.
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